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differentiation) in all oral participant presentations at the end of the course.
Introduction
Our theoretic starting point is that the wider context for radicalisation and involvement in violent extremism (RIVE) is the interpenetration of cultures arising from globalization, which can increase a sense of threat to different cultural groups' value priorities. When groups feel that their values or worldview are threatened by the presence of other cultural worldviews, this can lead to a defensive retrenchment to a value monist position that conserves cultural or religious traditions. 1 This maintains markers of social identity with the effect of highlighting differences between social groups, in accordance with social identity theory and social identity complexity theory. 2 While this protects people from uncertainty about identity and behavioural norms in the face of the competing value priorities of different cultures, it also reduces their complexity of thinking concerning intergroup relations. 3 Groups that are already primed to see their social world with low complexity are more easily attracted to the very low complexity, black and white, us versus them, extremist ideologies that are undergirded by value monism: one value must be realized above all others (the value the radicalizers themselves define per issue). 4
Radical groups ride on the normal defensive retrenchment to value monism and lowered complexity of thinking in the face of globalization threats, and work to intensify it through their ideology. The low complexity of extremist ideology has been substantiated by linguistic analysis (including integrative complexity analyses), with al-Qaida-related extremism showing the lowest complexity. 5 The normal tendency to prefer one's own ingroup, seen in social identity studies using the Minimal Group paradigm are further intensified through extremists' 'us versus them' binary constructions. 6 Extremist groups that employ a narrative explaining the social world as powerfully arrayed against the ingroup's interests can offer, for some, a pathway to belonging, significance and a purported means to address grievances. A period of sequestration from family and friends and total commitment to the extremist group is the usual further step that precedes involvement in violent strikes. 7
Our recent assessment of the Being Muslim Being British intervention supports the idea that increasing the complexity with which people think about the issues that radicalizers exploit reduces vulnerability to extremist messages, as a broad-based form of primary prevention. 8 That method, which we have applied here to the Being Kenyan Being Muslim intervention operationalizes relevant value conflicts while providing the resources for people to apply a wider spread of their own values, which in turn promotes thinking complexity.9 Our approach is inspired by Isaiah Berlin who posits that human values (e.g. freedom, equality, security, achievement, tradition, etc.) are all equally important and desirable. Values motivate behaviour and decisions; they organize cultural identity and bring significance to human life.10 Yet, due to limited resources or cultural constraints, individuals have to make choices: they often have to prioritise one value over the other, as any life context makes it extremely difficult to maximize all human values equally. Differences in value hierarchies between individuals and groups can be a source of conflict unless people are able to perceive some validity in the different value priorities of others, even if those don't agree with their own value hierarchies.11
The role that complexity in thinking plays in prevention of RIVE is supported by the finding that engineers, graduates of a field centered on problems that have a single, clear-cut, black and white answer, are significantly overrepresented among violent extremists. 12 Further, research based on extensive fieldwork with violent extremists shows that sacred values, defined structurally by the impossibility for any co-mingling with other values, play a key role in motivating the actions of extremists. 13 Our approach to primary prevention draws upon these lines of research and considers that, whatever pathway towards RIVE has been taken, what extremist ideologies have in common is a simple binary structure ('us versus them', 'right versus wrong') underpinned by value monism. This precise point of value monism is what we have targeted through our method of operationalizing value complexity in order to raise integrative complexity as a form of prevention in Kenya.
The above argument is in line with a comprehensive review commissioned by the United Kingdom (UK) government into prevention initiatives. 14 The report asserts that initiatives work best when they support open questioning in a peer group context and are focused on the harder skills such as critical thinking, appreciating different perspectives, developing a person's own worldview, learning to work well with others and appreciating tensions between different viewpoints. These enable people to critically examine extremist discourse. Long lasting benefits come through building resilience through affirming complex social identities and developing conflict management skills. These goals cohere with the value complexity approach to prevention discussed here.
Developing the Being Kenyan Being Muslim (BKBM) Intervention BKBM aims to remove the obstacles to participants' normal cognitive development as it progresses from simplicity to complexity. A vast literature supports that complex information processing, undergirded by the attempt to maximize multiple competing values, is associated with non-violent strategies for conflict resolution. 15 A large body of cross-cultural research by Peter Suedfeld and colleagues shows that conflict is predicted when integrative complexity (IC, from henceforth) drops from its recent baseline (measured in the communication of political decision-makers); conversely when IC rises, peaceful solutions to conflict ensue. 16 Because individuals are more receptive to messages with a complexity level similar to their own when thinking about conflicted social issues, increasing complexity builds resilience to the low complexity communications and recruitment efforts of extremists. 17
The pilot BKBM version (based on the structure of Being Muslim Being British) is a sixteen-contact-hour, multi-media course for people ages 16+ who are exposed to extremist discourse, as well as to train professionals who are seeking to counter extremism. BKBM was adapted to include relevant aspects of Kenyan culture, the impact of global terrorism on Kenyan society, and the consequences of the events of the Westgate terrorist attacks in Nairobi in 2013, followed by reprisals on the Somali community in Eastleigh, Nairobi, Mombasa and other areas of Kenya where there is a high Somali population. The intervention uses DVD films to represent an array of Muslim viewpoints from the extreme right to the extreme left including middle positions followed by group activities inspired by Theatre of the Oppressed pedagogy that help participants become aware of the value trade-offs in each position. 18 The original BMBB course materials were augmented with images and music from Kenyan society and popular culture, making the effects of poverty, politics, corruption and the development of the middle class within Kenya society explicit in the activities, as efforts to re-create the cultural milieu in which the social nature of thinking proceeds. 19 We piloted BKBM in Eastleigh, Nairobi, Kenya in January 2014. Over four intense days, the schedule in Kenya comprised: 
BKBM's three steps of transformation

Transformation Step 1: Differentiation
Like Being Muslim Being British, the explicit aim of BKBM is to increase thinking complexity promoted by value pluralism, measured by IC. 20 The first aspect of IC is differentiation, the ability to perceive multiple viewpoints or dimensions on an issue. 21 Eight topics used by radicalizers to increase cleavage between Muslim and Western-influenced worldviews and identities were selected, and each topic was presented from the differing perspectives of three to four well-known Muslim speakers via filmed interviews (on DVD) to promote differentiation. For example, in session 1, to address the topic "How should young Muslims should live in Kenya?" four influential speakers present their different viewpoints arguing for 1) an international Caliphate, 2) separatist (Salafist) personal piety, 3) integrating into society while maintaining Muslim identity and faith, and 4) support for jihadism. Through this, participants are motivated to make some sense of the variety of Muslim viewpoints, with group discussions relevant to tensions between Kenyans and ethnic Somalians, and are spurred to think afresh about the topic.
Transformation Step 2: Value Pluralism
Step 2 involves enabling participants to discover some validity in the values that undergird each of the four viewpoints, even the extreme ones, but without having to sacrifice other competing values-which is implicit in adopting every aspect of extreme viewpoints. This second step of enabling value pluralism is operationalized through a dilemma structure for the session, and in which participants can find reasons to maximise a wider array of their own values in their moral reasoning. We draw on Philip Tetlock's Value Pluralism model 22 that argues that a motivating force for doing the extra cognitive work of integratively complex thinking comes from the desire to maximise more than one value when those values are in tension with each other and each has high importance in participants' personal hierarchies. While extremist ideologies concentrate, for example, on the magnetic pull of one value, such as 'justice for the community', to the exclusion of 'individual liberty', BKBM enables people to explore the importance of both ends of various value spectrums.
After positioning the four film speakers along the value spectrums, participants are next invited to 'vote with their feet' to show where they personally position themselves on that value spectrum, and to explore the pushes and pulls they experience in their lives in Kenya. Participants are encouraged to think about both value poles in a way consonant with their own value priorities and real life constraints, rather than remaining 'stuck' in the value monism of radical discourse. In this way, cultural differences, for example, between Kenyan and Somali cultures, between aspirations for individual achievement versus loyalty to communitarian, traditional values, become easier to understand, and thus bridge, from a vantage point of value pluralism. This is done in the context of non-judgemental discussion of all the possible positions on the values continuum and the tensions between them. 23 Through these group-learning activities, the black and white categorizations resulting from increased cleavage between social groups begin to dissolve.
Transformation Step 3: Integration
Integratively complex thinking requires the ability to find some linkages between the different viewpoints, or to perceive an overarching framework that makes sense of why reasonable people can maintain differing views. 24 Value-complex solutions protect both sacred and secular values of different groups, and this in turn enables peaceful and stable resolutions for intergroup conflict (of which violent extremisms are a particular type) in the context of globalization.
For example, a group activity to foster integration (the discovery of linkages or frameworks to make sense of different viewpoints) centers around a conflict of interests between two polarized 'rich' and 'poor' groups, role-played by participants taking either the role of wealthy suburban home owners living in Nairobi suburb, or the role of refugee dwellers in a shanty town close to the town's borders. Participants experience how the conflict (physically, emotionally and cognitively) intensifies and polarizes perceptions of the ingroup and outgroup in the role play. As both groups' demands calcify, they slide into creating an over-simplified ideology, which intensifies the intergroup conflict as people rally to their group's slogans and group leader. Role playing enables participants to 'see' the polarization between groups intensifying in the room. 'Mediators' (role played by participants) are brought into the scene, and by focussing on the underlying human values of both groups' demands, some value commonalities are discovered, as well as recognizing that some differences will continue to remain. Negotiation becomes possible, though not easy, once some common values are recognized in both groups. Thus, the practical side of problem solving can begin.
Building on experiential, embodied group learning such as this, participants reflect upon the various tensions, for example, between economic and political principles that promote the interests of the rich, in comparison with those that promote the interests of the poor, freed from value monism and the social pressure arising from extremist discourse that presents any Western economic principles and Islamic finance as completely alien to each other. The black and white communications of radicalizers come to appear less convincing, as trade-offs that respect participants' own values are deemed possible, and are affirmed in a relevant peer group context. These activities enable a further set of IC-related skills: meta-cognition, social intelligence and embodied cognition. Meta-cognition is supported by Theatre of the Oppressed pedagogy as physically enacted role-play enables participants to 'see' themselves, their reactions and perceptions of others, and to reflect on that through group discussion. For example, a role-play where a 'stranger' walks into the zone of an already established social group enabled participants to perceive the pervasive ingroup/outgroup dynamics between Kenyans and Somalis. Social intelligence skills are supported through empathy-fostering activities such as 'active listening' practiced through role play in trios of participants trying to reconcile a conflict that was once experienced by one of the trio members. Mixed groups of participants, as in this sample, where both sides of the countering violent extremism (CVE) divide are involved in the role plays promotes the capacity to perceive differing perspectives. Experiencing cognition as embodied and multisensory is encouraged through group activities involving movement and mime, and through the multi-sensory DVD input (music, symbols, images, and film clips) resourcing a broader focus of attention, assuaging the defensive 'tunnel vision' of rigid thinking that can arise from concentrating on words and conceptual systems only. 25 The educational process works with the dilemma structure in each session, using physical and interpersonal enactment through role plays, leading to a more complex narrative understanding of CVE related issues, with participants reflecting analytically upon their experiences through discussion. Together these comprise the steps to complex critical thinking which in turn enables people to 'see through' the strategies of radicalizers.
Effectiveness Evaluation
We assessed the effectiveness of the eight session course through testing one main hypothesis and one exploratory hypothesis:
As a result of the intervention, participants will think in more complex ways about social issues underpinned by conflicting values by showing an increase in the levels if IC (IC) when comparing verbal data gathered just before and after the course.
The hypothesis was tested on two sets of verbal data: (Comparison 1) through the IC coding of written responses to Paragraph Completion Tests before and after the course, and (Comparison 2) through the qualitative analysis examining the presence of the two steps of IC (differentiation and integration) as applied by participants in the transcribed presentations each participant gave at the end of the course. 
Method
Sample and Recruitment
Twenty-four participants participated, with twenty-two completing all aspects of the Pre and Post testing assessment. Questionnaire data revealed a mean age of 29.6 (SD=6.27) years. Sex of participants was 12 (52 percent) males and 11 (48 percent) females (one missing). Of 24 participants, 23 (96 percent) were born in Kenya; one (4 percent) was born in Somalia, 18 (92 percent) had secondary education, 12 (50 percent) had technical college education (mean 1.7 years), 9 (37 percent) had university education (mean 3.6 years), and 12 (50 percent) had Islamic religious education (mean 6.5 years). Eighteen (75 percent) participants reported being in work; 7 (29 percent) reported being unemployed/looking for new work.
Participants' group/community of identification, or ingroup (the term used henceforth to indicate participants' group/community with which they reported they strongly identified) were:
• 'Muslim' (5 participants), 'Kenyan Muslim' (4),'Sunni Muslim'
(
Of the twenty-three participants, 14 (61 percent) report firstly a Muslim identity.
Participants' self-designated outgroup ('the group/community most different/opposed to my group') are listed below:
• Somalis (4), Somali & my own tribe (1) • Islam (1), Shias (2), Muslim/Christian/Islam (1), • Non-Somalis (1) • Christians (2), White Christians (1), • Western influenced (1), Secular (1), Secular & tribal (1) • My tribe (2), Kikuyu (1), Luo tribe (1), • Infidels & gangs (1), Terrorists (1), Al Shabaab (1), Radical Muslim youth (1), the inhumane (1) • Arab (1), Arabs & rich people (1), Hindu & rich people (1), Dishonest/fake (1), Non-coastal (1), African Rastafarians (1) • None/ I like everyone (2) Based on information from Kenya Transition Initiative staff, the participants are assigned to subgroups for statistical analysis: groups in terms of higher education (out of six, two attended technical college, one attended university) and regarding employment (four are in work involving sign writing, 'mobilizer', business and community work), with two participants unemployed/looking for work. Demographics that are distinctive for Subgroup 1 in comparison to the overall sample group concern gender balance (four males, two females), age (a higher mean age of 32), lower secondary education (four out of the six report having no secondary education (high school) whereas the rest of the sample have four years secondary and beyond), as well as fewer years in Islamic religious education (mean 4.8 years compared to 6.5 years). Subgroup 1 also showed slightly higher scores on the Social Identity & Power (SIP) Scale (mean = 20.3) compared to Subgroups 2 and 3 (mean = 17.15). The SIP Scale consists of five items concerning perceived power relations between participant's designated ingroup and outgroup. 27 Higher mean scores indicate that the participant agrees or strongly agrees with statements that their ingroup is treated unfairly by a more powerful outgroup that does not allow ingroup upward mobility, and whose position of power is now possible to overturn-a set of social perceptions that maps onto the structure of radical narratives. 28 Subgroup 4 (moderately vulnerable participants, n =2) shows a similar pattern to Subgroup 1 with relatively higher SIP scores (mean = 20.0) and fewer years in Islamic education (mean = 1 year) in comparison to the wider sample.
Sampling procedure
We were invited by the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI), funded by United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to trial BKBM in Kenya. Participants known through KTI's intensive fieldwork in the Eastleigh, Nairobi area were selected based upon recent activity or alignment with extremist groups or ideology, and were invited by KTI to participate in the pilot BKBM course. Subgroups 1 and 4 comprise the vulnerable-toextremism participants with whom KTI has been working, and Subgroup 3 comprise co-workers in the field, organizations and individuals to whom KTI subcontract. Subgroup 2 comprise KTI staff. A balanced spread such as this, comprising targeted individuals and intervention providers in a single IC course, helps to engender perspective taking on both sides of the extremism divide, and brings alive the tensions relating to extremism, contributing to learning outcomes. The BKBM course was facilitated by an experienced Being Muslim Being British facilitator who was born and raised in Kenya. Next, the facilitator led the participants in a 'Think Aloud' group warm-up exercise using two topics unrelated to extremism (preferred colours and foods) to encourage people to express their thinking freely and fully when writing out their responses. 'Think Aloud' technique is standard practice when researchers are more interested in process of thinking, the 'how' of thinking, rather than in the content of thinking. 29
Instruments/measures
Next, participants were asked to write as much as they can in the blank space provided to answer two open-ended questions: Transcripts of participant presentations were coded qualitatively for evidence of learning concerning the two steps of IC (differentiation and integration), and for evidence of confidence to address extremist issues with IC skills, and for increases in social intelligence (such as empathy for the 'other').
Integrative complexity (IC). All IC coding for the Paragraph Completion Tests followed the standardized IC coding frame and protocol. 31 Inter-coder reliability criteria was assessed by calculating Kappa levels between two trained coders blind to the pre-intervention post-intervention conditions. 
Results
Intercoder Reliability
In order to verify the reliability of IC scores across pre and post conditions, one researcher coded all the paragraphs from the Paragraph Completion Tests (4 x 22 = 88), blind to pre-post conditions. In accordance with accepted practice, a secondary scorer blind to the pre-post conditions, coded eight paragraphs (around 10 percent of a stratified random subsample, representing relevant subgroups and spread of IC Thus, IC gains were strongest concerning ingroup, although both ingroup and o subgroups showed a similar
Subgroups
The four subgroups show staff) showed the highest IC means in both Pre (former al Shabaab members) showed the lowes Post test, with the smallest magnitude of change. groups showed IC gain, and there were no between according to a Oneway
Chart 2: IC Pre and
Hypothesis 1 was supported overall. had an effect of increasing the complexity with which participants think about social issues and social groups relevant to extremism as indicated by levels of IC.
Comparison 2. Hypothesis 2 Participants' Presentations
At the end of the final session, participant The facilitator had instructed to give a presentation at the end of Session 8 through the course, and how they specific situations relevant to presentation. These were tape recorded (yiel transcribed verbatim. presence of learning about and applying ability to perceive the validity of two or more dimensions, viewpoints or outcomes to temporal se perceive underlying common values, linkages between, or overarching frameworks, that make sense of the differentiated array verbal data that fulfilled these were summed for a final cumulative This is a qualitative measure constructs; it is not a coding of the structure of argumentation.
Thus, IC gains were strongest concerning participants' self-designated both ingroup and outgroup IC gains are significant. similar trend of higher IC gains for the ingroup ubgroups showed differences in overall IC gains. Subgroup 2 (KTI staff) showed the highest IC means in both Pre and Post tests. Subgroup 1 abaab members) showed the lowest IC means in both Pre and Post test, with the smallest magnitude of change. See Chart 2. However, all showed IC gain, and there were no between groups differences according to a Oneway analysis of variance, F (22)=1.086, p=0.167.
re and Post Test Gains by Subgroups
Hypothesis 1 was supported overall. Results indicate that the intervention had an effect of increasing the complexity with which participants think about social issues and social groups relevant to extremism as indicated by levels of Comparison 2. Hypothesis 2: Evidence of Application of IC in resentations e end of the final session, participants gave a presentation to the group The facilitator had instructed participants in Session 5 that they will at the end of Session 8 to share what they have through the course, and how they are applying, or wish to apply IC specific situations relevant to their life. All twenty-two participants gave a These were tape recorded (yielding 1.5 hours of tape) and
The transcripts were qualitatively analyzed f learning about and applying step 1 of IC, differentiation ( ability to perceive the validity of two or more dimensions, viewpoints or outcomes to temporal sequences) and step 2 of IC, integration (the ability to perceive underlying common values, linkages between, or overarching frameworks, that make sense of the differentiated array). Each 'chunk' of verbal data that fulfilled either of these criteria was given a score of 1, and these were summed for a final cumulative Participant Presentation S This is a qualitative measure of participants internalizing and applying IC ; it is not a coding of the structure of argumentation. designated IC gains are significant. All four ngroup.
IC gains. Subgroup 2 (KTI Subgroup 1 in both Pre and However, all groups differences .
Results indicate that the intervention had an effect of increasing the complexity with which participants think about social issues and social groups relevant to extremism as indicated by levels of to the group.
will be asked to share what they have learned wish to apply IC (or not) to rticipants gave a ape) and for the iation (the ability to perceive the validity of two or more dimensions, viewpoints or the ability to perceive underlying common values, linkages between, or overarching Each 'chunk' of given a score of 1, and Presentation Score. and applying IC Age correlated negatively with IC scores in the Pre test concerning participants' ingroup, (Pearsons r (20)= -0.477, p = 0.029, two tailed).
Correlations with conflict styles
Years in Islamic religious education correlated negatively with the Direct conflict style in the Pre test (Pearsons r (20)= -.665, p <0.025, two tailed). In the Post test, the negative correlation is lower, and not significant (-.117, ns) . This pattern of negative correlation was evident across all four Subgroups.
The Avoid conflict style Post test correlates negatively with mean IC in the Post test (Pearsons r (20) = -0.439, p = 0.041, two tailed). There were no other significant correlations between conflict styles and IC.
Discussion
The BKBM course results shows overall significant gains in IC in written responses to Paragraph Completion tests, from a mean IC score of 1.3 in the Pre test to a score of 1.9 in the Post test. An IC score of 1 (from a scale of 1 to 7) indicates the lowest level of integrative: viewing, for example, social groups categorically (all good or all bad), dichotomising the social world into 'us versus then', judging the domain in question from a single evaluative viewpoint, rejecting other viewpoints or dimensions ('only my viewpoint is correct'), reducing ambiguity (no shades of grey, no mixture), with causation simply conceived as, for example, 'x causes y'.
As the complexity of extremist discourse decreases as commitment to violence increases, the very low IC level of AQ discourse inevitably precludes any other means to resolve conflict other than mobilisation to their cause. 36 As this constructed moral obligation to engage in violent conflict comes to be seen as unecessary through the IC intervention, more productive means to resolve conflict become possible. New ways of resolving conflict are experienced within the course and validated within a relevant peer group.
An IC score of 2 (rounding up from 1.9) signifies emerging or conditional acceptance of other dimensions or viewpoints regarding the issue at hand, though this is not extensively developed. At an IC score of 2, rather than seeing the social world categorically and dichotomously, now multiple dimensions to an issue and exceptions to the rule are being acknowledged. Shades of grey, rather than black or white choices, are conditionally accepted, there is an increased tolerance for ambiguity, and an acceptance that others may hold different viewpoints from one's one. However, this is a transitional stage given that argumentation is not extensively elaborated. In this study, this significant increase to an IC score of 2, while not large numerically, is a meaningful change in regards to the diminishment of violent conflict: other ways of construing the social world are now made possible, the categorical, black and white structure of the extremist worldview is dissolving.
It is acknowledged that there are floor effects to measuring IC. It is quite hard to capture enough argumentation or evaluation in verbal data for IC to be scorable, and this is particularly hard under written 'test conditions' such as the written Pre and Post testing here. The advantage of measuring IC is that, as well as being predictive of the outcomes of conflict, the structure of thinking is relatively unfakable. When people think, their attention is focused on the content of their thinking, not its underlying structure. Thus, to capture a significant change in the structure of thinking represents data that is virtually unfakable on the part of participants, especially under test conditions where pre-planning is not possible. Whereas it is acknowledged that speakers can apply some 'impression management' in their verbalizations, for example, using lower IC when speaking to children, it would be very hard to fake a rise in IC concerning issues one feels strongly about.
In line with theories of individual cognitive development, and that of and early humans, change in the structure of argument (measured by IC) leveraged in the BKBM intervention represents the last stage of a series of deeper changes that firstly involve embodied enactment, then interpersonal, episodic learning, thirdly linking those earlier stages into a narrative, and finally reflecting upon that conceptually. 37 Thus, we argue that the changes that are visible through IC coding are in fact the tip of a deeper 'iceberg'. We are pleased that we were able to capture significant IC gain, given the known floor effects of IC and the challenge of eliciting verbal data showing argument or evaluation under test conditions. We also think that Gains in IC are significant for participants' self-designated ingroup and outgroup, but are of greater magnitude for the ingroup. This may reflect that fact that information about one's own ingroup is more readily available to thinkers. 39 It also mirrors the process of de-radicalization described in autobiographical accounts of those who have exited extremist groups. 40 In these accounts, extremists de-covert from their former radical cause often through a growing awareness of the flaws and contradictions of the extremist ingroup, particularly the ingroup leaders. The growing perception that the extremist ingroup comprises variously motivated individuals who are mixture of both good and bad is a crucial step towards being able to critically analyse the ingroup's mission and methods. BKBM helps to bring about this awareness indirectly, as a direct frontal attack against a participant's ingroup and its ideology is likely to elicit defensiveness. Instead, our approach is to leverage the skills of complex thinking across a range of issues (some directly concerning extremism, others concern underlying issues, such as family relationships, gender equality and sex) and through increasing participants' recognition of their own spread of values.
A low complexity paragraph about a participants' ingroup is seen in this Pretest paragraph:
"al Shabaab -the most important obligation for Muslims is to make kufirs suffer for what they have inflicted on Muslims living in that." (IC score 1, former al Shabaab member, Pre test)
A higher complexity paragraph about another participants' ingroup is seen in this Post-test paragraph:
"I feel my group [Christians] deliberately misleads its members about what Muslims believe in. I feel there is a subtle hatred in a way. There is a feeling that their belief is not grounded in history and that is not true. There is a misunderstanding about what Muslims believe in simply because Christians do not know a lot about Muslims. I feel that some people (Christians) can not tell the difference between Somalis, Arabs and Muslims, and that makes it hard for them to differentiate between cultures and religion. I also wish this community should learn to be more accomodating as they have more power and the more extreme they get in thought, the more it is bad for reconciliation and finding a true understanding between Muslims and Christians." (IC score 4, showing multiple dimensions and causality understood as implicitly involving mutual influence, Subgroup 3 participant, Post test).
We expected that the four Subgroups would show differences in IC gains, and this was the case. Nevertheless, there were no significant between-groups differences. The most professionally resourced group, Subgroup 2, (KTI staff), showed the highest mean IC in the Pre test, and the highest mean in the Post test. Subgroup 1 (former al Shabaab members) showed the lowest IC in the Pre test and Post test. Two factors seem relevant here: Subgroup 1 had four (of six) participants with no secondary (high school) education as well as less Islamic religious education, compared to the wider group. They also showed higher SIP scores, indicative of the influence of extremist narrative. These factors make it likely that Subgroup 1 faced a longer and harder journey in emerging from very low IC, although progress was made.
It is interesting that years in Islamic religious education correlates negatively with IC regarding the Pre test, but correlates positively (and significantly) for the outgroup in the Post test. The correlation between Islamic education and IC is the only correlation that shows significant reversal, comparing Pre to Post conditions. It seems that IC, as a result of the intervention, is acting as a moderator on the variable 'years in Islamic religious education', at least in regard to perceptions of the outgroup in the Post test. If this interpretation is correct, IC seems to 'turbo charge' traditional Islamic teaching regarding mercy and benevolence to the 'other' in the Post test. Years in university correlates moderately with IC gain (but not significantly so) towards the ingroup (only), whereas years in technical college correlates negatively with IC (also not significantly) in both Pre and Post tests, in line with research showing that those well trained to solve problems having a concrete 'right answer' (such as engineering problems) are over-represented among violent extremists. 41
The negative correlation between SIP scores and IC provides a snapshot of the essence of the problem that all counter-extremism efforts face: those more deeply committed to an extremist narrative have a longer journey to emerge from it, and this is particularly so if the nature and length of education fails to resource the normal developmental pathway from simplicity to complexity. The results of this BKBM course show encouraging but realistic results in this regard: the IC approach does work with individuals at the 'sharp end' of prevention who are more closely aligned to the structure of the extremist narrative (and, here, who are also under-resourced through a lack of secondary education). However, the gains in IC for Subgroup 1 are more modest than with the other groups, and these participants would have benefitted from more time and personal mentoring, had the schedule allowed.
We originally developed Being Muslim Being British for primary prevention, for anyone potentially vulnerable to radicalization in the early stages. In this pilot of Being Kenyan Being Muslim, the stakes have been raised with the inclusion of participants who have been members of a terrorist group. We have recently argued in a U.S. State Department White Paper, that secondary and tertiary prevention needs to take a multi-agency approach, to which the IC method can bring an important contribution. 42 In a further roll-out of BKBM seeking to include violent extremists (as in this pilot), the IC intervention will need to be part of a joined-up strategy with other agencies for ongoing support. Recruiting a mixed group of participants including target audience and prevention workers, as in this project, works to kickstart a multi-agency approach, as well as eliciting intense discussion and involvement. We also advise that one-to-one IC mentoring is provided for extremely vulnerable participants in addition to the BKBM course to help them consolidate the gains that the IC sessions produce. Normal practice is to run an IC intervention over a four to eight week duration (not over days as in this pilot, necessitated by schedule and budget constraints), and to assign practical weekly homework tasks. Longer periods for processing the material helps participants to reflect upon and integrate the new ways of thinking. It is also normal practice for group size to be capped at twelve to sixteen participants, rather than twenty-four as in this pilot. Despire these challenges, including the need for ongoing translations between English, Swahili and Somali during each session, it is encouraging that the BKBM intervention did show significant IC gains.
Participant Presentations
Through empirical assessments of other IC courses (I SEE for Scotland, an anti-sectarian IC course, and Conflict Transformation, a course for various inter-group conflicts, and Being Muslim Being British), we have observed two kinds of effects: (1) changes to the less-than-conscious structure of thinking, measured by IC coding, and (2) learned cognitive, emotional and interpersonal skills. 43 To assess the latter effect, we analysed participant presentations for evidence of learning about and application of IC skills. The participant presentations at the end of the course make it easier for participants to reveal the extent of their IC learning as they have time to prepare what they want to share (prepared verbal data is similar to the speeches, letters, parliamentary proceedings that are usually used for integrative complexity research). 44 We qualitatively analyzed the verbatim transcripts of twenty-two presentations for presence of understanding and application of (1) differentiation, (2) integration, (3) social intelligence (empathy for others, insight into self or others, greater emotional control) and (4) confidence in applying IC skills.
Differentiation
All participant presentations showed instances of participants applying the construct of differentiation: the ability to perceive multiple dimensions to an issue and that there is some validity in different views, exceptions to the rule, and changes over time. Examples include:
"IC is about how we perceive the world. Seeing through our religious faith, not just blind faith, but using both head and heart. IC allows you to see the shadows, to see both points of view. Active listening helps you to interact well." (Subgroup 3 It may be that the Collaboration conflict style, which builds on the hope of win/win solutions achieved for both parties, seems unrealistic in the Eastleigh, Nairobi context given the widespread lack of trust between groups and potential danger in daily public life (all four conflict scenarios concerned events played out in public). The Compromise conflict style, giving away something in order to get something, may seem akin to the practice of resolving disputes through giving baksheesh, a problem that was discussed by large majority of participants, speaking of endemic corruption and the ubiquitous nature of the giving and receiving of bribes. Pre test. It is arguable that values of traditional religious self-transcendence are in tension with the Direct conflict style in which the person clearly states their viewpoint regarding a conflict, and considers the issue important enough to stick their neck out, even if there is cost to the relationships involved. 47 It may be that the ethic of self-transcendence taught in Islamic education is moderated by the IC intervention, which then allowed participants in the Post-test to choose the Direct conflict style, perhaps because it was deemed was more effective within the Kenyan context. If this interpretation is correct, this accords with participants' general sense of empowerment and confidence at the end of the course, as well as IC as a moderator of years in Islamic religious education.
The developers of the conflict styles constructs originally viewed Collaborate as the best, most adaptive conflict style, as it seeks win /win solutions using creative thinking. 48 (Compromise enables both parties to get some but not most of what they want.) The preference for Collaboration as the 'best' conflict style was later amended, as it became evident that all five conflict styles can be used positively for resolving conflict. What matters is the ability to choose the conflict style that best suits the situation (a form of metacognition), and having pro-social motivations and social intelligence in using the conflict styles. This parallels research that acknowledges that high levels of IC are not universal goods given the cognitive costs of highly complex thinking in certain situations. 49 For both conflict styles and IC, it seems what is needed is meta-cognition to enable flexibility and awareness of context. Because the IC of extremist ideology is so low, the first step in countering extremism is to enable participants to raise their IC. But thereafter, the more advanced skills of IC concern meta-cognition to assess the situation for the most appropriate level of IC.
For a future roll-out of the course, BKBM course gains can be strengthened, as argued above, through using the standard course run over weeks (not days) along with one-to-one mentoring for highly vulnerable participants. The final course version is planned to include tensions between Christians and Muslims, the gap between the (newly) rich and the poor, and lack of security, all of which are part of the context of radicalization. Community settings will continue to provide good contexts for disseminating BKBM, but we think that in the future the widest dissemination of IC courses will be through schools (for ages 11 and upwards). We are already working in schools in several countries, and early results show that the most disruptive students undergo significant behavioural changes (independently observed by teachers and head teachers). Our next project is taking place in a large number of schools in south Asia, and this provides an opportunity for control groups and longitudinal research.
Conclusion
The positive participant response in conjunction with the empirical data indicates that BKBM was a success in Kenya. BKBM's method of exposing participants to a multiplicity of value priorities through group activities structured to enable participants to explore the implications of the whole of the value spectrum was measured through pre and post testing. The written data showed, as hypothesized, significant gains in IC, the ability to think in more complex ways about the issues relevant to extremism, measured by IC, followed by even greater IC understanding and application evident in the participant presentations. According to the integrative complexity literature, and in line with RIVE research and prevention initiatives, such changes predict pro-social rather than violent means to resolve conflict. Participants' significant shift towards Direct as a conflict style is in line with the new confidence and empowerment participants expressed. The overall picture supports the efficacy of this IC and values complexity based intervention, designed originally for broad-based primary prevention, but here also shown to be an effective model for former al Shabaab members as well.
Scenario 2: You are waiting in line to get on a bus, and there is an argument between the bus driver, a Kenyan, and a passenger whom you know from your community. The bus driver is angry and is making the Somali get off the bus. You wonder what the Somali did wrong, and yet you also know that there is often unfair prejudice against Somalians. What do you do?
a. You decide that you should calm the situation by asking your fellow Somali to make peace with the bus driver and to comply. b. You intervene straight away to confront the bullying bus driver; meanwhile you call your Somali friends who are in line for the bus to give you back up. c. You don't want to inflame this trivial-looking situation, so you stay out of it. You wander off to catch another bus. d. You speak to the bus driver in Swahili and ask him what the problem is. Then you speak in Somali to the Somalian and ask him what the problem is. You offer to help both parties get what they need, with neither losing face. e. You think that maybe the bus driver is inflating the cost of the ticket because the Somali has a lot of luggage, so you suggest that the Somali should pay just a little bit more for his ticket, but not the full price the bus driver is demanding.
Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire
Post test
Scenario 1: It's the Africa Nations Cup game, and Somalia is playing against _______ team (you decide which team this is). You are in a bus full of supporters of your team. A bus from the rival team comes up alongside your bus. E veryone in both buses goes wild, shouting, pounding on the windows. Then someone throws something at the rival team bus. This is dangerous. What do you do?
a. You say to the person, "Hey," throw something at me. Whatever they throw at you, you then quietly pass it to someone else and say-pass it on. Then you start passing something else. Several things are now being passed around the bus in a friendly way. b. You roll down the window and tell the fans in the other bus they can throw something back at your bus. c. You sink down in your seat and close your eyes. You don't want anything to do with this. d. You say directly to the man in your bus who is throwing things and tell him to stop it. Does he want to be responsible if the bus gets pulled over by the police? e. You put your arm around the man throwing things and tell him you don't want him to get in trouble. Looking around the bus, you say:
We're all friends and we stick together.
Scenario 2: Walking home, you see some young kids from your neighborhood hanging out on the street. You see them stopping another young kid -a youngster from another part of town, from a different background -and picking a fight with him. What do you do?
